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Abstract—We study physical-layer security in wireless ad hoc
networks and investigate two types of multi-antenna transmission
schemes for providing secrecy enhancements. To establish secure
transmission against malicious eavesdroppers, we consider the
generation of artificial noise with either sectoring or beamform-
ing. For both approaches, we provide a statistical characterization
and tradeoff analysis of the outage performance of the legitimate
communication and the eavesdropping links. We then investi-
gate the networkwide secrecy throughput performance of both
schemes in terms of the secrecy transmission capacity, and study
the optimal power allocation between the information signal and
the artificial noise. Our analysis indicates that, under transmit
power optimization, the beamforming scheme outperforms the
sectoring scheme, except for the case where the number of
transmit antennas are sufficiently large. Our study also reveals
some interesting differences between the optimal power allocation
for the sectoring and beamforming schemes.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, ad hoc networks, multi-
antenna transmission, artificial noise, power allocation, outage
probability, throughput optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
INFORMATION security is a prime concern in emergingwireless networks. Traditional security mechanisms, typ-
ically involving cryptographic algorithms, implicitly assume
that any potential eavesdroppers have limited computational
abilities. Rapid development of computing hardware, how-
ever, has meant that there is an ever-increasing suscepti-
bility of such methods to attack. To address this problem
and further strengthen existing wireless security technolo-
gies, physical-layer security mechanisms [1–3] have recently
attracted significant attention. Such mechanisms work by
exploiting the physical properties of the wireless medium
in order to provide an additional layer of robustness which
is “information-theoretically secure”. In the past decade,
physical-layer security techniques have been proposed in many
different communication scenarios; e.g., multi-input multi-
output, relay/jammer-assisted, cognitive-radio-enabled, and so
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on (see e.g., [4–9] and the references therein). Very recently,
physical-layer security techniques have also been introduced
into large-scale decentralized ad hoc networks, in order to
provide enhanced secrecy performance [10–18].
When characterizing the networkwide secrecy throughput
of large-scale networks, the interference due to concurrent
transmissions plays an important role. On the one hand, from
the point of view of the legitimate receivers, interference is
a nuisance which leads to unwanted throughput loss; whilst,
on the other hand, to the eavesdroppers, interference makes
it more difficult to intercept transmissions (thereby providing
enhanced security). In decentralized networks, it is reasonable
to assume that the legitimate receivers do not have sophisti-
cated multi-user decoding capabilities, and thereby treat inter-
ference simply as noise. For the eavesdroppers, however, one
should typically not make such strong assumptions, since the
capabilities of eavesdroppers are often unknown. This has led
researchers to design for a worst-case scenario (see e.g., [15–
17]), whereby the eavesdroppers are assumed to be capable of
performing multi-user decoding (e.g., successive interference
cancellation), allowing the interference created by concurrent
transmission of information signals to be potentially resolved.
In order to confuse eavesdroppers with multi-user decod-
ability in ad hoc networks, methods have been introduced
in [16, 17] based on generating artificial noise (see [19, 20])
or cooperative jamming (see [21, 22]). In both cases, the aim
is to create non-resolvable interference at the eavesdroppers.
Specifically, in [16], the legitimate users which are far away
from the intended receiver were selected to emit artificial
noise; while in [17], a certain percentage of legitimate users
were randomly chosen to radiate jamming signals. Note that
when the legitimate nodes have only a single antenna, as
in [16, 17], some legitimate users must suspend their own mes-
sage transmission in order to deliver artificial noise or jamming
signals. In [18], the authors considered the case where there
are many multi-antenna helping jammers, generating artificial
interference but zero-forcing to nearby legitimate receivers.
The injected jamming signals can also help to deal with
eavesdroppers with multi-user decodability. However, in some
cases, such a large number of helping jammers may not be
obtainable and when this happens, the designed transmission
scheme might be vulnerable.
A. Our Approach and Contribution
In this paper, we consider two artificial-noise-aided multi-
antenna transmission strategies, based on antenna sectoring
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2or beamforming, for providing secrecy in wireless ad hoc
networks. Knowing the direction of the intended receiver, with
antenna sectoring, an information signal is transmitted towards
the intended receiver, while artificial noise is simultaneously
radiated in other sectors. With the channel state informa-
tion (CSI) of the intended receiver, through beamforming, arti-
ficial noise is injected into the null-space of the intended chan-
nel, leaving the intended receiver unaffected. Note that these
two transmission schemes do not require any instantaneous
channel knowledge of the eavesdroppers. With the proposed
transmission schemes, non-resolvable interference is created at
the potential eavesdroppers by the introduced artificial noise,
allowing us to guarantee a target secrecy throughput, which
appears difficult without using artificial noise. Moreover, as a
major advantage of these schemes, no legitimate users must
stop their own message transmission, which is in contrast
to the single-antenna transmission approaches [16, 17]. In
particular, since the artificial-noise generated interference is
created by the legitimate transmitters themselves, the system
can work in the absence of helping jammers [18].
Previous studies in [19–30] have clearly shown that smartly
injecting artificial interference can achieve secrecy enhance-
ments in point-to-point scenarios. In such cases, the artificial
noise generated from multi-antenna beamforming results in
interference in some subspaces but no interference in others.
Contrarily, in ad hoc networks where transmitters generate
artificial noise in a decentralized manner, artificial interfer-
ence is created collectively in all subspaces over the entire
network. In short, the artificial-noise-aided beamforming and
sectoring schemes considered in this paper have a cooperative
jamming effect in ad hoc networks, which ensures that every
eavesdropper is subjected to jamming. With these cooperative
jamming effects, it is unclear how well the proposed artificial-
noise-aided multi-antenna transmission schemes can work in
large-scale networks, as a means of jointly providing high
communication performance and security. Our main objective
is to address this key question.
For both the sectoring and beamforming schemes, we
characterize the performance of the legitimate link and the
eavesdropping link, by deriving new closed-form expressions
for the connection and secrecy outage probabilities respec-
tively. We then illustrate the tradeoff between the connection
and secrecy outage performance. Under constraints on the
connection and secrecy outage probabilities, we quantify the
achievable secrecy throughput performance of both schemes
in terms of the secrecy transmission capacity. Finally, we
investigate the optimal power allocation between the infor-
mation signal and the artificial noise which maximizes the
secrecy transmission capacity, and compare the corresponding
maximum secrecy transmission capacity of both schemes. Our
analytical and numerical results suggest that the considered
multi-antenna transmission schemes can achieve significant
secrecy enhancements in wireless ad hoc networks.
We observe that by adding extra transmit antennas, the
optimal ratio of power allocated to the information signal that
maximizes the secrecy transmission capacity of the beamform-
ing scheme converges to a certain fraction which is strictly less
than one, while that for the sectoring scheme keeps increasing
towards one. We show that as the number of transmit antennas
grows large, for both the sectoring and beamforming schemes,
the optimized secrecy transmission capacity increases log-
arithmically. Our analysis also indicates that, in terms of
the optimized secrecy transmission capacity, the beamforming
scheme outperforms the sectoring scheme for a wide range
of antenna numbers, at the expense of requiring additional
channel knowledge. Nevertheless, as the number of transmit
antennas becomes sufficiently large, quite interestingly, the
sectoring scheme can achieve a better throughput performance
than the beamforming scheme. The performance crossover
happens at a larger antenna number if the secrecy outage
constraint becomes more stringent.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the system model and illustrate the proposed
transmission schemes. In Section III, we characterize the
outage performance of the sectoring scheme. In Section IV,
we study the outage performance of the beamforming scheme.
In Section V, we analyze and compare the secrecy through-
put performance of the sectoring and beamforming schemes.
Finally, in Section VI, we conclude this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The legitimate transmitters and malicious eavesdroppers are
modeled by two independent homogeneous Poisson point pro-
cesses (PPPs) on a two dimensional plane R2 with densities λl
and λe, respectively. The location sets of the legitimate trans-
mitters and eavesdroppers are denoted by ΦL and ΦE , respec-
tively. Following the widely-used bipolar network model [31,
32], we assume that every transmitter has an intended receiver
at distance r in a random direction1. Each transmitter is
equipped with N transmit antennas, while each receiver (both
legitimate and malicious) has a single receive antenna. In
addition to an exponential path loss with parameter α > 2, the
wireless channels are assumed to be experiencing independent
Rayleigh fading. Since we are studying large-scale networks
with uncoordinated concurrent transmissions, the aggregate
interference will be dominant, and the local thermal noise is
usually negligible. As done in [13, 14, 17], we omit the thermal
noise and use the signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) as the main
performance metric.
The total transmit power at each transmitter is denoted by P .
Define φ as the ratio of the power of the information signal
to the total transmit power. Thus, the power allocated to the
information signal is PI = Pφ, while the power allocated
to the artificial noise is PA = P (1− φ). In the following,
we consider the use of artificial noise in the form of either
sectoring or beamforming, for providing secrecy against the
malicious eavesdroppers.
1This bipolar network model is suitable for modeling the case where the
distance from the transmitter to the intended receiver is relatively small,
compared with the distances between the transmitters, and it is widely used
in the literature (see e.g., [13, 17, 18, 31, 32]). Generalization can be made by
setting the distance r as a random variable following a certain distribution,
and then averaging the network performance over the distribution of r, as
mentioned in [31].
3A. Sectoring with Artificial Noise
With N directional antennas, each transmitter can send
independent signals in N disjoint sectors, each of these
covering 2piN radians with an antenna gain GN . The antenna
gain usually increases as the spread angle decreases (i.e.,
increasing N ). As done in [12], we assume that the side-
lobes are suppressed sufficiently and thus can be omitted
in later analysis2. We then consider the following scheme
to combine sectoring with artificial noise generation: Each
transmitter sends an information signal in the sector containing
its intended receiver, while simultaneously emitting artificial
noise in all other sectors, creating non-resolvable interference
to the malicious eavesdroppers. Note that the transmitter
needs to know the direction of the intended receiver and this
information can be accurately obtained through the discovery
mechanisms, such as the “informed discovery” mechanism
in [33], where the feedback from the intended receiver is
exploited for a high accuracy. We further assume that the
time needed for acquiring and feeding back this directional
information is negligible. Note that this sectoring scheme does
not require the CSI at the transmitter. With the antenna gain,
in the intended sector, the information signal is transmitted
with power GNPI , while in each of the other N − 1 sectors,
artificial noise is radiated with power GNPAN−1 .
B. Beamforming with Artificial Noise
With N omnidirectional antennas, the transmitters can per-
form artificial-noise-aided beamforming [19, 20]. To do this,
the instantaneous CSI of the intended receiver is needed at the
associated transmitter. This information can be obtained via
pilot training and we assume that the time needed for the train-
ing phase is negligible. With the CSI, the transmitter performs
maximal ratio transmission towards the intended receiver with
power PI . Meanwhile, to confuse the malicious eavesdroppers,
artificial noise with total power PA is uniformly injected into
the null space of the intended channel. To be specific, denoting
the intended channel by h, an orthonormal basis is generated
at the transmitter as
[
h
‖h‖ ,W
]
, where W is a N × (N − 1)
matrix, the columns of which are mutually orthogonal while
also being orthogonal to h‖h‖ . The message vector to be
transmitted will then have the following form:
x =
h
‖h‖u+Wv (1)
where u is the information signal, assumed to be complex
Gaussian distributed with variance PI ; v is the artificial noise
vector, the entries of which are complex Gaussian distributed
with zero mean and variance σ2v =
PA
N−1 .
2We point out that the analytical results can be generalized to incorporate
the sidelobe leakage signals, by accounting for the eavesdroppers outside
the main lobe of the intended sector, and carefully evaluating the aggregate
artificial noise received by the eavesdroppers. However, the resulting analytical
expressions become much more complicated, whilst few new insights can be
extracted. In fact, it can be shown that, as long as the leakage signals in the
sidelobes are not particularly strong, the resulting performance degradations
are insignificant. For simplicity, we focus on the case of perfectly sectorized
antennas with negligible sidelobes.
C. Wiretap Coding and Outage Definition
Here we explain the coding scheme and the outage def-
initions. Before transmission, the data is encoded using the
wiretap code [1]. The codeword rate and the secret message
rate are denoted by Rb and Rs, respectively. The codeword
rate Rb is the actual transmission rate of the codewords, while
the secrecy rate Rs is the rate of the embedded message.
The rate redundancy Re := Rb − Rs is intentionally added,
in order to provide secrecy against malicious eavesdropping.
More discussions on code construction can be found in [34]. If
the channel from the transmitter to its intended receiver cannot
support the codeword rate Rb, the receiver may not be able to
decode the transmitted codeword correctly. We consider this
as a connection outage event.
There are possibly several eavesdroppers trying to intercept
the same transmitter, while the exact number of them is
unknown. To minimize the assumption on the eavesdroppers’
behavior and design for a worst case, we consider the scenario
where all eavesdroppers are trying to decode the message from
the transmitter under consideration. Therefore, if the channel
from the transmitter to any of the eavesdroppers can support
a data rate larger than the embedded rate redundancy Re, this
transmission fails to achieve perfect secrecy and a secrecy
outage is deemed to occur [35]. As mentioned in [14], this
kind of secrecy outage formulation provides a “strong” secrecy
performance.
Note that we assume the legitimate receivers do not ap-
ply multi-user decoding techniques. Thus, the interference at
the legitimate receivers consists of the information signals
and the artificial noise. On the other hand, we assume that
the eavesdroppers are capable of multi-user decoding, i.e.,
resolving concurrent transmissions. In order to design the
network parameters to achieve the maximum level of secrecy,
as done in [15–17], we consider a worst-case assumption to
overestimate the eavesdroppers’ multi-user decodability: For
the signal reception at any eavesdropper, only the artificial
noise constitutes the interference, whereas the received infor-
mation signals are resolvable and hence are not part of the
interference.
III. OUTAGE PERFORMANCE OF SECTORING SCHEME
In this section, we study the outage performance of the
sectoring scheme. We start by deriving the outage probability
of the intended links. Then, we characterize the possibility that
the transmitted message is not secure against the malicious
eavesdroppers.
A. Connection Outage Probability
Here, we derive the connection outage probability pco. A
threshold SIR value for connection outage is defined as βb.
We focus on a typical transmitter-receiver pair and place
the receiver at the origin of the coordinate system. From
Slivnyak’s theorem [36], the distribution of all other nodes’
locations will not be affected; thus, the obtained statistics can
reflect the system performance accurately.
For the typical receiver at the origin, the interfering nodes
can be classified into two classes: 1) interferers transmitting
4information signals towards the typical receiver; 2) interferers
sending artificial noise towards the typical receiver. With such
a classification, by [36], the transmitters in ΦL can be divided
into two independent homogeneous PPPs, which are denoted
as ΦI and ΦA with densities 1N λl and
N−1
N λl, respectively.
Then, the aggregate interference resulting from the trans-
mitters in ΦI and ΦA is given by
II = GNPI
∑
x∈ΦI
SxoD
−α
xo
IA =
GNPA
N − 1
∑
x∈ΦA
SxoD
−α
xo (2)
where Dxo represents the distance from the transmitter at x
to the typical receiver at the origin, and Sxo represents the
corresponding channel gain. With independent Rayleigh fad-
ing, the channel gains Sxo are independent and exponentially
distributed with unit mean, i.e., Sxo ∼ Exp (1). The channel
gain from the typical transmitter to the typical receiver is
denoted by So, with So ∼ Exp (1). The SIR at the typical
receiver is given by
SIRo = GNPISor
−α (II + IA)
−1 (3)
and the connection outage probability is given by
pco = Pr (SIRo ≤ βb) . (4)
This can be derived in closed-form and is presented in the
following theorem:
Theorem 1. The connection outage probability of the sector-
ing scheme in (4) is given by
pco=1−exp
(
−β
2
α
b λlCα,2r
2
N
(
1+(N−1)1−2α (φ−1−1) 2α)) (5)
where
Cα,N := pi
Γ
(
N − 1 + 2α
)
Γ
(
1− 2α
)
Γ (N − 1) (6)
and Γ (·) is the gamma function.
Proof: See Appendix A.
From (5), we observe that as the distance between each
transmitter-receiver pair r or the density of the transmitters λl
increases, the connection outage probability increases towards
one (as expected), with the rate of increase being exponential
in r2 or λl. In the latter case, as λl increases, more transmitters
“on average” will be closer to any given legitimate receiver,
leading to an increased connection outage probability.
From (5), for a given power allocation ratio, it can be shown
that with a relatively small path-loss exponent, i.e., α = 2 ∼ 4,
the connection outage probability decreases when extra direc-
tional antennas are added. The improvement comes from two
aspects: 1) the intended sectors shrink and thus the legitimate
receivers are interfered by less information signals; 2) the
power allocated to the artificial noise is distributed in more
sectors and thus the legitimate receivers are interfered by
relatively less artificial noise.
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
Here, we characterize the secrecy outage probability pso. A
threshold SIR value for secrecy outage is defined as βe. As
before, we focus on a typical transmitter-receiver pair but shift
the coordinate system to put the transmitter at the origin. The
message from the typical transmitter is not secure against the
eavesdropper at z if SIRz > βe, where SIRz denotes the SIR
received by the eavesdropper at z. With the sectoring scheme,
only the eavesdroppers inside the intended sector of the typical
transmitter may cause secrecy outage. Those eavesdroppers
form a fan-shaped PPP and by [36, Theorem A.1], they can
be mapped as a homogeneous PPP on the whole plane, denoted
by ΦZ with density 1N λe.
As done in [15–17], we design for a worst-case scenario
by overestimating the eavesdroppers’ multi-user decodability:
The aggregate interference at the eavesdropper side consists
of the artificial noise only. By [36], the transmitters which
are radiating artificial noise towards the eavesdropper at z
form a homogeneous PPP ΦA with density N−1N λl. Hence,
the interference seen by the eavesdropper at z is
IA =
GNPA
N − 1
∑
x∈ΦA
SxzD
−α
xz (7)
where Dxz represents the distance from the transmitter at x
to the eavesdropper at z, whilst Sxz ∼ Exp (1) represents the
corresponding channel gain.
The SIR received by the eavesdropper at z is given by
SIRz = GNPISozD
−α
oz I
−1
A (8)
where Doz represents the distance from the typical transmitter
to the eavesdropper at z, whilst Soz ∼ Exp (1) represents the
corresponding channel gain.
By taking the complement of the probability that the trans-
mitted message is secure against all of the eavesdroppers, the
secrecy outage probability can be expressed as
pso = 1− EΦA
{
EΦZ
{ ∏
z∈ΦZ
Pr (SIRz < βe|ΦA)
}}
. (9)
The following theorem presents closed-form upper and lower
bounds for this quantity:
Theorem 2. The secrecy outage probability of the sectoring
scheme in (9) satisfies
pLBso ≤ pso ≤ pUBso (10)
where
pUBso = 1− exp
(
−
pi
Cα,2
λe
λl
β
2
α
e (N − 1)1−
2
α (φ−1 − 1) 2α
)
(11)
and
pLBso =
piλe
piλe + λlCα,2β
2
α
e (N − 1)1−
2
α (φ−1 − 1) 2α
(12)
with Cα,2 defined in (6).
Proof: See Appendix B.
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Fig. 1. The secrecy outage probability bounds of the sectoring scheme in (11)
and (12) and the simulation results versus the power allocation ratio. Results
are shown for the case where α = 4, λl = 0.01, λe = 0.001 and βe = 1.
In the low outage region (i.e., as pso → 0), the upper bound
in (11) and the lower bound in (12) share the same leading
order term:
pUBso ≈
pi
Cα,2
λe
λl
β
2
α
e (N − 1)1−
2
α (φ−1 − 1) 2α
≈ pLBso (13)
implying that they both approach the exact secrecy outage
probability as it becomes small. As shown in Fig. 1, the upper
bound in (11) gives a very accurate approximation for the
entire range of the secrecy outage probabilities shown, while
the lower bound in (12) gets asymptotically accurate as the
secrecy outage probability becomes small.
From (11), we see that the secrecy outage probability
increases with increasing the eavesdroppers’ density λe. In-
tuitively, as λe increases, more eavesdroppers “on average”
will be closer to any given transmitter, which leads to an
increased secrecy outage probability. More interestingly, the
secrecy outage probability in (11) depends on the densities
of the transmitter-receiver pairs and the eavesdroppers solely
through their ratio λeλl .
From (11), we observe that for a given power allocation
ratio, the secrecy outage probability can be reduced by adding
extra directional transmit antennas. This result follows the
intuition that by adding transmit antennas: 1) the intended
sector shrinks and thus less eavesdroppers may cause secrecy
outage; 2) the artificial noise from other transmitters covers a
larger region and thus more eavesdroppers are degraded.
IV. OUTAGE PERFORMANCE OF BEAMFORMING SCHEME
In this section, we characterize the outage performance
of the beamforming scheme. As before, we first derive the
outage probability of the intended links. Then, we inspect the
possibility that the transmitted message is not secure against
malicious eavesdropping.
A. Connection Outage Probability
To facilitate our subsequent analysis, we first derive the
distribution of the interference power resulting from the beam-
forming signal in (1).
Lemma 1. For a given realization of the intended chan-
nel h, if the transmitted signal x in (1) is received by a
non-intended receiver through an unknown channel hz , and
if PI 6= PAN−1 (i.e., φ 6= 1N ), then the resulting interference
power Px is distributed according to the following probability
density function (p.d.f.):
fPx (z) =
1
PI
(
1− PA
(N − 1)PI
)1−N
e
− z
PI (14)
×
1− e−(N−1PA − 1PI )z N−2∑
k=0
(
N−1
PA
− 1
PI
)k
zk
k!
 , z>0 .
Meanwhile, if φ = 1N , Px is gamma distributed with
shape parameter N and scale parameter PI , i.e., Px ∼
Gamma (N,PI). Note that the distribution of Px is indepen-
dent of the intended channel (i.e., h).
Proof: See Appendix C.
With Lemma 1, we now derive the connection outage
probability pco. A threshold SIR value for connection outage
is defined as βb. As before, we focus on a typical transmitter-
receiver pair, and put the typical receiver at the origin to
observe the network performance. We denote the interference
power from the transmitter at x to the typical receiver by Pxo,
where the path loss is excluded. Note that Pxo admits the p.d.f.
in (14). The aggregate interference seen by the typical receiver
is given by
IIA =
∑
x∈ΦL
PxoD
−α
xo (15)
where Dxo denotes the distance from the transmitter at x to
the typical receiver at the origin.
The channel vector from the typical transmitter to the typical
receiver is denoted as ho. With Rayleigh fading, the elements
of ho are independent complex Gaussian distributed with zero
mean and unit variance. With the beamforming strategy in (1),
the SIR at the typical receiver is given by
SIRo = PI‖ho‖2r−αI−1IA (16)
and the connection outage probability is then given by
pco = Pr (SIRo ≤ βb) . (17)
We have the following key theorem:
Theorem 3. The connection outage probability of the beam-
forming scheme in (17) admits
pco=1−e−β
2
α
b
ψ(φ)−e−β
2
α
b
ψ(φ)
N−1∑
p=1
1
p!
p∑
k=1
(
2
α
β
2
α
b ψ(φ)
)k
ζ(p,k) (18)
where ψ (φ) is defined in (19) and
ζ(p,k)=
∑
θ∈comb(p−1p−k)
∏
li∈θ
i=1,...,p−k
(
li − 2
α
(li − i+ 1)
)
. (20)
Here comb
(
p−1
p−k
)
is the set of all distinct subsets of the
natural numbers {1, 2, . . . , p− 1} with cardinality p− k. For
each subset, the elements are arranged in an increasing order
and li ∈ θ is the i-th element of θ. For p ≥ 1, ζ (p, p) = 1.
Proof: See Appendix D.
6ψ (φ) =
piλlr
2Γ
(
1− 2α
) (
N−φ−1
N−1
)1−N (
Γ
(
1 + 2α
)− (φ−1−1N−1 )1+ 2α ∑N−2k=0 (N−φ−1N−1 )k Γ(k+1+ 2α )Γ(k+1) ) if φ 6= 1N
piλlr
2 Γ(1− 2α )Γ(N+ 2α )
Γ(N) if φ =
1
N
(19)
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Fig. 2. The connection outage probability of the beamforming scheme in (18),
the low outage approximation in (21) and the simulation results versus the
power allocation ratio. Results are shown for the case where λl = 0.01,
r = 1, α = 4 and βb = 3.
Due to the complexity of the derived expression in (18),
observing the effects of varying the key system parameters
such as the power allocation ratio φ and the number of transmit
antennas N seems difficult. Nevertheless, with (18), we may
readily evaluate the system performance and thereby avoid
large-scale network simulations. In the low outage region, a
much simpler approximation can be found as follows:
Corollary 1. In the low outage region (i.e., as pco → 0), the
connection outage probability in (18) can be approximated by
p˜co = β
2
α
b ψ (φ)Kα,N (21)
where ψ (φ) is defined in (19) and
Kα,N = 1− 2
α
N−1∑
p=1
1
p!
p−1∏
l=1
(
l − 2
α
)
. (22)
Proof: See Appendix E.
As demonstrated in Fig. 2, for outage probabilities of
practical interests, the difference between the exact value and
the low outage approximation in (21) can hardly be seen.
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
Here we derive the secrecy outage probability pso. A thresh-
old SIR value for secrecy outage is defined as βe. As before,
we focus on a typical transmitter-receiver pair but shift the
coordinate system to put the transmitter at the origin.
As done in [15–17], we design for a worst-case scenario
by overestimating the eavesdroppers’ multi-user decodability:
The aggregate interference at the eavesdropper side consists
of the artificial noise only. We denote the channel from the
transmitter at x to the eavesdropper at z by hxz . For the
eavesdropper at z, by (1), the artificial noise received from
the transmitter at x is given by hHxzWxvx, where Wx and vx
constitute the beamforming matrix and the artificial noise
vector for the transmitter at x. Define gxz := hHxzWx and note
that gxz is a N−1 dimensional row vector. The corresponding
interference power is given by ‖gxz‖2σ2v , where σ2v = PAN−1 is
the variance of each element of vx. Then, for the eavesdropper
at z, the aggregate interference created by the artificial noise
from the transmitters in ΦL is given by
IA =
PA
N − 1
∑
x∈ΦL
‖gxz‖2D−αxz (23)
where Dxz denotes the distance from the transmitter at x to
the eavesdropper at z. Since the columns of Wx are unit-norm
and mutually orthogonal, the elements of gxz are independent
complex Gaussian distributed with zero mean and unit vari-
ance; thus, we know that ‖gxz‖2 ∼ Gamma (N − 1, 1). Note
that the eavesdroppers will also be jammed by the artificial
noise from the typical transmitter. Similar to the discussions
above, for the eavesdropper at z, the interference power
created by the typical transmitter is given by PAN−1‖goz‖2D−αoz ,
where ‖goz‖2 ∼ Gamma (N − 1, 1), and Doz is the distance
from the typical transmitter to the eavesdropper at z.
Denote ho as the channel from the typical transmitter
to the typical receiver, and hoz as the channel from the
typical transmitter to the eavesdropper at z. Then, denote the
channel gain resulting from Rayleigh fading from the typical
transmitter to the eavesdropper at z by Soz . Due to the fact
that the typical transmitter is beamforming towards the typical
receiver, the channel gain Soz is given by
Soz =
∣∣∣∣hHoz ho‖ho‖
∣∣∣∣2 ∼ Exp (1) . (24)
The SIR for the eavesdropper at z is then given by
SIRz =
PISozD
−α
oz
PA
N−1‖goz‖2D−αoz + IA
. (25)
By taking the complement of the probability that the trans-
mitted message is secure against all of the eavesdroppers, the
secrecy outage probability can be expressed as
pso =1−EΦL
{
EΦE
{ ∏
z∈ΦE
Pr (SIRz<βe|ΦL)
}}
. (26)
We can find closed-form upper and lower bounds as follows:
Theorem 4. The secrecy outage probability of the beamform-
ing scheme in (26) satisfies
pLBso ≤ pso ≤ pUBso (27)
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Fig. 3. The secrecy outage probability bounds of the beamforming scheme
in (28) and (29) and the simulation results versus the power allocation ratio.
Results are shown for the case where α = 4, λl = 0.01, λe = 0.001
and βe = 3.
where
pUBso = 1− exp
−λe
λl
pi
(
βe
φ−1−1
N−1 + 1
)1−N
Cα,N
(
βe
φ−1−1
N−1
) 2
α
 (28)
and
pLBso =
(
βe
φ−1−1
N−1 +1
)1−N
piλe
piλe+λlCα,N
(
βe
φ−1−1
N−1
) 2
α
(29)
with Cα,N defined in (6).
Proof: See Appendix F.
In the low outage region (i.e., as pso → 0), the upper bound
in (28) and the lower bound in (29) share the same leading
order term:
pUBso ≈ pLeadso :=
λe
λl
pi
(
βe
φ−1−1
N−1 + 1
)1−N
Cα,N
(
βe
φ−1−1
N−1
) 2
α
≈ pLBso (30)
implying that these two bounds both capture the leading order
behavior of the secrecy outage probability as it becomes
small. The leading order term pLeadso can serve as an accurate
approximation for the secrecy outage probability in the low
outage region. As shown in Fig. 3, the upper bound in (28)
gives a very accurate approximation for the entire range of
the secrecy outage probabilities shown, while the lower bound
in (29) gets asymptotically accurate as the secrecy outage
probability becomes small.
We point out that with the p.d.f. provided in Lemma 1, fol-
lowing a similar procedure as that used in deriving Theorem 4,
it is not difficult to study the case where the eavesdroppers do
not have multi-user decodability and simply treat interference
as noise. This argument also applies to the sectoring scheme.
However, as we mentioned in the introduction, in order to
achieve the maximum level of secrecy, assuming eavesdrop-
pers with multi-user decodability is a more robust approach.
Therefore, in this paper, we retain our focus on this case.
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and βe = 1.
Connection and Secrecy Outage Tradeoff: As shown in
Fig. 4, for both the sectoring and beamforming schemes, when
giving more power to the information signal (i.e., increasing
the power allocation ratio φ), the connection outage proba-
bility pco decreases whilst the secrecy outage probability pso
increases. Hence, there is a tradeoff between the connection
and secrecy outage performance w.r.t. the transmit power
allocation.
V. SECRECY THROUGHPUT PERFORMANCE
In this section, based on the outage probability expressions
obtained in the last two sections, we investigate the network-
wide secrecy throughput performance for the sectoring and
beamforming schemes, in terms of the secrecy transmission
capacity [13].
The secrecy transmission capacity is defined as the achiev-
able rate of successful transmission of confidential messages
per unit area with constraints on both the connection and
secrecy outage probabilities. With outage constraints pco = σ
and pso = , the corresponding secrecy transmission capacity
is given by
C = (1− σ)λlRs
= (1− σ)λl [Rb −Re]+ (31)
where [x]+ = max {0, x}. Note that the message rate Rs is a
function of σ and , since Rb = log2 (1 + βb) is determined by
the connection outage constraint σ, while Re = log2 (1 + βe)
is determined by the secrecy outage constraint . When-
ever Rb−Re is negative, the required secrecy and connection
outage performance cannot be guaranteed simultaneously, and
the message transmission should be suspended. More discus-
sions on the relationship between the transmission rates and
the outage events can be found in Section II-C.
A. Sectoring Scheme
Here we characterize the secrecy transmission capacity of
the sectoring scheme in the following proposition:
8Proposition 1. For the sectoring scheme, a tight lower bound
to the secrecy transmission capacity in (31) can be given by
CLBSector =(1−σ)λl (32)
×
log2

1 +
( N
λlCα,2 r
2 ln( 11−σ )
1+(N−1)1− 2α (φ−1−1) 2α
)α
2
1 +
(
pi
Cα,2
λe
λl
ln( 11− )(N−1)1−
2
α (φ−1−1) 2α
)α
2


+
with Cα,2 defined in (6).
Proof: From (5) and (11), we solve pco = σ and pUBso = 
w.r.t. Rb = log2 (1 + βb) and R
UB
e = log2 (1 + βe), respec-
tively. Then, plugging the obtained Rb and RUBe into (31), we
have the lower bound in (32).
Note that (32) is derived based on the secrecy outage
probability upper bound in (11). Since (11) tracks the exact
secrecy outage probability very closely, the lower bound
in (32) provides a tight approximation to the actual secrecy
transmission capacity. From (32), we observe that the secrecy
transmission capacity increases logarithmically as the number
of transmit antennas grows large. The underlying reason is
that under the outage constraints, as the number of transmit
antennas grows large, the supported codeword rate Rb in-
creases logarithmically, while the required rate redundancy Re
diminishes.
By properly adjusting the power allocation ratio φ, we can
maximize the secrecy transmission capacity. Though a general
expression for the optimal φ seems not available, we still have
the following corollary:
Corollary 2. The optimal power allocation ratio φ∗ of the
sectoring scheme, which maximizes the tight secrecy trans-
mission capacity lower bound CLBSector in (32), is unique and
can be found by numerically solving for the root of the first-
order derivative of CLBSector w.r.t. φ. This is true even if the
objective function is generally non-concave.
Proof: See Appendix G.
For the case where α = 4, setting the derivative of CLBSector
in (32) w.r.t. φ to zero gives a cubic equation and solving it
provides a closed-form expression for φ∗. Define:
%=
N
λlCα,2 r2
ln
(
1
1− σ
)
, ς=
1
ln
(
1
1−
) pi
Cα,2
λe
λl
(33)
κ=%2+ς2+
(
%2−ς2+
√(
(%−ς)2+1
)(
(%+ς)
2
+1
))(
%2−ς2) .
Then, the optimal power allocation ratio for α = 4 is
φα=4Sector=
1+ ς 23
(
2
2
3%
4
3ς
1
3κ
2
3 +2
4
3%2ς+2%
2
3ς
5
3κ
1
3
)2
4(N−1)% 43κ 23 (%2−ς2)2

−1
. (34)
We observe that as N → ∞, φα=4Sector = 1−O
(
N−1
)
.
In other words, the optimal power allocation ratio increases
towards one as the number of transmit antennas grows large.
This observation can be explained by noting that adding extra
transmit antennas allows the transmitter to concentrate more
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Fig. 5. The optimal power allocation ratio of the sectoring and beamforming
schemes versus the number of transmit antennas. Results are shown for the
case where λl = 0.01, λe = 0.001, r = 1, σ = 0.1 and  = 0.01.
on the transmission towards the intended receiver, while less
and less eavesdroppers may cause secrecy outage. Hence,
more transmit power can be given to the information signal to
achieve a better throughput performance, while still satisfying
the connection and secrecy outage constraints. As can be seen
from Fig. 5, the observations made from the case where α = 4
holds more generally for 3 ≤ α ≤ 5. The numerical results
in Fig. 6 indicate that with optimized power allocation, the
secrecy transmission capacity increases logarithmically as the
number of transmit antennas grows large, which agrees with
our earlier observation made from (32).
B. Beamforming Scheme
Now we study the secrecy transmission capacity of the
beamforming scheme. Generally speaking, the secrecy trans-
mission capacity can be computed by solving pco = σ
w.r.t. Rb = log2 (1 + βb) from (18) and solving pso = 
w.r.t. Re = log2 (1 + βe) from (26), and then plugging the
obtained results into (31). However, the equation pco = σ
seems not analytically solvable due to the existence of multiple
summations. Note that the typical value of the connection
outage constraint σ is expected to be small (e.g., below 0.1).
This allows us to use the low outage approximation provided
in (21). Letting p˜co = σ, recalling that Rb = log2 (1 + βb),
the supported codeword rate Rb can be approximated by
R˜b = log2
[
1 +
(
σ
ψ (φ)Kα,N
)α
2
]
(35)
where ψ (φ) and Kα,N are defined in (19) and (22), respec-
tively.
Then, we need to solve pso =  w.r.t. Re = log2 (1 + βe).
Note that the secrecy outage constraint  is also expected to be
small (e.g., below 0.1), this allows us to use the leading-order
low outage approximation of the secrecy outage probability
in (30). In the special case of α = 4 and N = 2, by
solving pLeadso = , which turns to be a cubic equation, an
approximation to the required rate redundancy Re can be
9obtained as follows:
R˜e=log2
1+
φ
1−φ

(
108piλe
λlCα,2
+12
√(
9piλe
λlCα,2
)2
+12
) 2
3
−12
6
3
√
108piλe
λlCα,2
+12
√(
9piλe
λlCα,2
)2
+12

2
 (36)
where Cα,2 is defined in (6). Plugging (35) and (36) into (31),
we have a closed-form approximation for the secrecy trans-
mission capacity of the beamforming scheme when α = 4
and N = 2:
CApproxBeam = (1− σ)λl
[
R˜b − R˜e
]+
. (37)
Unfortunately, it seems that we cannot extend the analytical
results to the case where N ≥ 3, due to the fact that there
is not a general algebraic solution for the quintic (i.e., fifth
order) equation and above (see Abel’s impossibility theorem
in [37], an alternative proof to it written in English can
be found in [38]). Hence, for these cases, we study the
secrecy transmission capacity numerically. From (30), by
solving pLeadso =  w.r.t. Re = log2 (1 + βe), an approximation
to the required rate redundancy can be obtained and we denote
it as R˜e. Then, plugging R˜b in (35) and R˜e into (31), we
have an approximation for the secrecy transmission capacity
of the beamforming scheme, which can be written as (37).
Note that this approximation is very accurate for small out-
age constraints (i.e., σ and ), since the outage probability
approximations in (21) and (30) are both very accurate in the
low outage region. We then numerically optimize the power
allocation to maximize the secrecy transmission capacity.
As illustrated in Fig. 5, as the number of transmit anten-
nas N grows large, the optimal power allocation ratio that
maximizes the secrecy transmission capacity of the beamform-
ing scheme converges to a certain value, which is strictly less
than one. Here we explain why the optimal power allocation
ratio does not increase to one. Note that the density of
the eavesdroppers which may cause secrecy outage does not
change with increasing N . More importantly, as N increases,
the power of the emitted artificial noise decreases, and the
increments of the artificial interference brought by adding
extra transmit antennas will be neutralized. In such cases,
giving too much power to the information signal will break
the secrecy outage constraint and thus the optimal power
allocation ratio will not increase to one. As demonstrated
in Fig. 6, with optimized transmit power allocation, as N
grows large, the maximum secrecy transmission capacity of
the beamforming scheme increases logarithmically, which is
similar to the sectoring scheme.
C. Sectoring versus Beamforming
Here we compare the sectoring and beamforming schemes,
in terms of the optimal power allocation ratio that maximizes
the secrecy transmission capacity and the corresponding max-
imum secrecy transmission capacity.
Regarding the optimal power allocation ratio:
• As shown in Fig. 5, as the number of transmit antennas N
increases, the optimal power allocation ratio for the
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Fig. 6. The maximum secrecy transmission capacity of the sectoring and
beamforming schemes versus the number of transmit antennas. Results are
shown for the case where λl = 0.01, λe = 0.001, r = 1, σ = 0.1 and
 = 0.01.
beamforming scheme converges to a certain value which
is less than one, while that for the sectoring scheme
keeps increasing towards one. This difference can be
explained by noting that for the beamforming scheme,
with increasing N , the equivalent density of eavesdrop-
pers which may cause secrecy outage remains the same,
while that for the sectoring scheme decreases inversely
linearly. Hence, the reduced secrecy outage probability
of the sectoring scheme allows the transmitters to give
more transmit power to the information signal, while still
satisfying the secrecy outage constraint, which is not true
for the beamforming scheme.
• As shown in Fig. 5, when the path-loss becomes more
severe (i.e., as α increases), the optimal power allocation
ratio for the beamforming scheme decreases. More inter-
estingly, with increasing α and N , there is twist in the
optimal power allocation ratio of the sectoring scheme.
The underlying reason is that with increasing N , the
optimal power allocation ratio of the sectoring scheme
increases faster in a high path-loss environment.
Regarding the maximum secrecy transmission capacity:
• As shown in Fig. 6, the beamforming scheme outper-
forms the sectoring scheme for a wide range of antenna
numbers, in terms of achieving a larger secrecy trans-
mission capacity. This makes sense because that having
more channel knowledge at the transmitters, such that
beamforming can be performed, is generally better than
having directional transmit antennas, which are needed
for the sectoring scheme.
• However, when N becomes sufficiently large, the sec-
toring scheme can achieve a larger secrecy transmission
capacity, compared with the beamforming scheme. The
reason behind this is that with increasing N , the trans-
mitter of the sectoring scheme becomes quite capable
of concentrating the transmission towards the intended
receiver while less and less eavesdroppers may cause
secrecy outage. As can be seen from Fig. 5, the cor-
responding optimal power allocation ratio also increases
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with increasing N , giving more transmit power to the
information signals to achieve a better throughput perfor-
mance. In addition, the performance crossover between
the sectoring and beamforming schemes happens at a
larger N if the secrecy outage constraint becomes more
stringent (i.e., reducing ).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied physical-layer security in wireless
ad hoc networks and investigated two types of multi-antenna
transmission schemes. In particular, in order to jam the eaves-
droppers over the entire network, we combined artificial noise
with either sectoring or beamforming. For these two schemes,
we provided closed-form expressions for the connection and
secrecy outage probabilities and showed the tradeoff between
them. We then quantified the secrecy throughput performance
for both schemes in terms of the secrecy transmission capacity.
Our results indicated that the proposed transmission schemes
can provide significant secrecy enhancements over single-
antenna methods. Our analysis also shed light on the behavior
of the optimal power allocation between the information signal
and the artificial noise for achieving the maximum secrecy
throughput.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Here we derive the connection outage probability in (5).
By (2), the total interference seen by the typical receiver at
the origin is II + IA. Since II and IA are two independent
shot noise processes, by [31, eq. (8)], the Laplace transform
of the p.d.f. of II + IA is given by
LII+IA(s)=exp
(
−λlCα,2G
2
α
N
N
(
P
2
α
I +(N−1)1−
2
αP
2
α
A
)
s
2
α
)
(38)
where Cα,2 is defined in (6).
By (3) and (4), we have
pco = 1− Pr
(
So ≥ βbr
α
GNPI
(II + IA)
)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
− βbr
α
GNPI
z
)
fII+IA (z) dz
= 1− LII+IA
(
βbr
α
GNPI
)
(39)
where fII+IA (·) is the p.d.f. of II+IA and the last line comes
from the definition of the Laplace transform. Then, plugging
in the Laplace transform in (38) leads to the results in (5).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
We first derive the secrecy outage probability upper bound
in (11). By [31, eq. (8)], the Laplace transform of the p.d.f.
of the aggregate artificial noise IA in (7) is given by
LIA (s) = exp
(
−λlCα,2G
2
α
N
N
(N − 1)1− 2α P 2αA s
2
α
)
(40)
where Cα,2 is defined in (6).
By applying the probability generating functional of a
PPP (see Definition A.5 in [36]) to the inner expectation of (9),
we have
pso =1−EΦA
{
exp
(
−λe
N
∫
R2
Pr(SIRz>βe|ΦA)dz
)}
. (41)
Invoking the bounding technique used in [13, 39] (i.e., apply-
ing Jensen’s inequality), we get the following upper bound:
pso≤pUBso :=1−exp
(
−λe
N
∫
R2
Pr (SIRz > βe) dz
)
=1−exp
(
−λe
N
∫
R2
LIA
(
βeD
α
oz
GNPI
)
dz
)
. (42)
Plugging in (40) and changing to a polar coordinate system to
evaluate the integral yields the results in (11).
By considering the nearest eavesdropper only, we now
derive the secrecy outage probability lower bound in (12).
Denote the location of the nearest eavesdropper by n. By [40,
eq. (2)], the distance between the typical transmitter and the
nearest eavesdropper in ΦZ , denoted by Don, is distributed
according to the following p.d.f.:
fDon (z) =
2piλe
N
z e−
piλe
N z
2
, z > 0 . (43)
The received SIR at this eavesdropper is given by
SIRn = GNPISonD
−α
on I
−1
A (44)
where Son ∼ Exp (1), IA is the aggregate artificial noise,
defined in (7).
By (44), the secrecy outage probability in (9) can be lower
bounded by
pso ≥ pLBso := Pr (SIRn > βe)
= EDon,IA
[
exp
(
−βeD
α
on
GNPI
IA
)]
= EDon
[
LIA
(
βeD
α
on
GNPI
)]
. (45)
Using (40) and (43) to evaluate the last expectation yields the
results in (12).
C. Proof of Lemma 1
Here we derive the interference distribution in (14). For
a given realization of the intended channel h and with the
beamforming strategy in (1), the covariance matrix of the
transmitted signal vector x is
Cx = PI
hhH
‖h‖2 +
PA
N − 1WW
H . (46)
Noting that WWH = I− hhH‖h‖2 , we can rewrite the covariance
matrix as
Cx =
PA
N − 1I+
(
PI − PA
N − 1
)
hhH
‖h‖2 . (47)
If this signal x is received by a non-intended receiver through
an unknown channel hz , the corresponding interference power
is given by
Px =
PA
N − 1‖hz‖
2 +
(
PI − PA
N − 1
) ∣∣∣∣hHz h‖h‖
∣∣∣∣2 . (48)
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For a given h 6= 0 and with a random hz , the interference
power Px can be interpreted as the weighted sum of the
squared magnitude of hz and the squared magnitude of the
projection of hz on the direction of h. Hence, the amplitude
of h is irrelevant and only its direction matters; more impor-
tantly, with the ergodicity of hz over the symmetric complex
space, the statistical distribution of Px becomes independent of
the direction of h. For this reason, we set h = [1, 0, . . . , 0]T to
characterize the distribution of Px. Denote the elements of hz
as hzi with i = 1, . . . , N . The interference power Px can be
expressed as
Px = PI |hz1|2 + PA
N − 1
N∑
i=2
|hzi|2 . (49)
We first consider the case where PI 6= PAN−1 (i.e., φ 6= 1N ).
Note that PI |hz1|2 ∼ Exp
(
1
PI
)
and PAN−1
∑N
i=2 |hzi|2 ∼
Gamma
(
N − 1, PAN−1
)
are mutually independent. The p.d.f.
of Px can be computed as
fPx (z) =
1
PI
(
1− PA
(N − 1)PI
)1−N
e
− zPI
× γ
(
N − 1,
(
N − 1
PA
− 1
PI
)
z
)
, z > 0 (50)
where γ (·, ·) is the regularized lower incomplete gamma
function. Plugging in the series representation of γ (·, ·) yields
the results in (14). Note that the expression above does not
hold for PI = PAN−1 (i.e., φ =
1
N ). From (49), it is clear that
when φ = 1N , Px ∼ Gamma (N,PI).
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Here we derive the connection outage probability in (18).
By [31, eq. (8)], the Laplace transform of the p.d.f. of the
aggregate interference IIA in (15) is given by
LIIA (s) = exp
(
−λlpiE
[
P
2
α
x
]
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
s
2
α
)
. (51)
If PI 6= PAN−1 (i.e., φ 6= 1N ), by (14), E
[
P
2
α
x
]
is given in (52);
and if PI = PAN−1 (i.e., φ =
1
N ), we have
E
[
P
2
α
x
]
= P
2
α
I
Γ
(
N + 2α
)
Γ (N)
. (53)
In (16), ‖ho‖2 ∼ Gamma (N, 1) and its complementary
cumulative distribution function takes the form in [41, eq. (9)],
with N = {1}, K = {1, . . . , N − 1} and ank = 1k! . Hence,
with the Laplace transformation obtained in (51), we can
invoke [41, Theorem 1] to characterize the connection outage
probability as follows:
pco = 1−
N−1∑
p=0
[
(−s)p
p!
dp
dsp
LIIA (s)
]
s=
βbr
α
PI
. (54)
By convention, the zero-th order derivative denotes the func-
tion itself. Plugging (51) into (54), we have the results in (18).
E. Proof of Corollary 1
Here we derive a low outage approximation for the con-
nection outage probability in (18). From (18) and (19), it is
clear that when ψ (φ) → 0, the connection outage probabil-
ity pco → 0. Note that the quantity ψ (φ) couples many system
parameters like r and λl, and more importantly, φ and N . By
making ψ (φ) small, we are effectively studying all cases of
system parameters that may lead to a small pco, including but
not limited to the asymptotic regions where r → 0 or λl → 0.
We expand (18) around ψ (φ) = 0 as follows:
pco=β
2
α
b ψ(φ)−e−β
2
α
b
ψ(φ)β
2
α
b ψ(φ)
2
α
N−1∑
p=1
1
p!
ζ(p, 1)+O (ψ(φ)2)
=β
2
α
b ψ (φ)−β
2
α
b ψ (φ)
2
α
N−1∑
p=1
1
p!
p−1∏
l=1
(
l− 2
α
)
+O (ψ (φ)2) (55)
where ζ (·, ·) is defined in (20). Ignoring the high order terms
gives the results in (21).
F. Proof of Theorem 4
We first derive the secrecy outage probability upper bound
in (28). By [31, eq. (8)], the Laplace transform of the p.d.f.
of the aggregate artificial noise IA in (23) is given by
LIA (s) = exp
(
−λlCα,N
(
PA
N − 1
) 2
α
s
2
α
)
(56)
where Cα,N was defined in (6).
Using the generating functional of a PPP (see Definition A.5
in [36]), by (26), we have
pso = 1− EΦL
{
exp
[
−λe
∫
R2
Pr (SIRz > βe|ΦL) dz
]}
≤ 1− exp
[
−λe
∫
R2
Pr (SIRz > βe) dz
]
(57)
where the second line is obtained by applying Jensen’s in-
equality. By (25), the probability inside the integral can be
evaluated as
Pr (SIRz > βe) (58)
= E‖goz‖2,IA
{
exp
(
−βeD
α
oz
PI
(
PA
N − 1‖goz‖
2D−αoz + IA
))}
=
(
βe
φ−1 − 1
N − 1 + 1
)1−N
LIA
(
βeD
α
oz
PI
)
=
(
βe
φ−1 − 1
N − 1 + 1
)1−N
exp
(
−β
2
α
e D
2
ozλlCα,N
(
φ−1 − 1
N − 1
) 2
α
)
.
Plugging (58) into (57), after changing to a polar coordinate
system, evaluating the integral gives the results in (28).
By considering the nearest eavesdropper only, we now
derive the secrecy outage probability lower bound in (29).
Denote the location of the nearest eavesdropper by n. By [40,
eq. (2)], the distance between the typical transmitter and the
nearest eavesdropper in ΦE , denoted by Don, is distributed
according to the following p.d.f.:
fDon (z) = 2piλez e
−piλez2 , z > 0 . (59)
The received SIR at this eavesdropper is given by
SIRn =
PISonD
−α
on
PA
N−1‖gon‖2D−αon + IA
(60)
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E
[
P
2
α
x
]
=
1
PI
(
1− PA
(N−1)PI
)1−N (
P
1+ 2α
I Γ
(
1+
2
α
)
−
(
PA
N−1
)1+ 2α N−2∑
k=0
(
1− PA
(N−1)PI
)k Γ (k + 1 + 2α)
Γ (k + 1)
)
(52)
where Son ∼ Exp (1), ‖gon‖2 ∼ Gamma (N − 1, 1) and IA
is the aggregate artificial noise, defined in (23).
Then, the secrecy outage probability in (26) can be lower
bounded by
pso ≥ pLBso
:= EDon,IA,‖gon‖2
[
Pr
(
SIRn > βe|Don, IA, ‖gon‖2
)]
=
(
βe
φ−1 − 1
N − 1 + 1
)1−N
EDon,IA
[
exp
(
−D
α
onβe
PI
IA
)]
=
(
βe
φ−1 − 1
N − 1 + 1
)1−N
EDon
[
LIA
(
Dαonβe
PI
)]
. (61)
Plugging in (56) and (59) to evaluate the last expectation leads
to the results in (29).
G. Proof of Corollary 2
Here we show that the optimal power allocation ratio that
maximizes the secrecy transmission capacity lower bound
in (32) is unique. Define the following quantities:
x := (N − 1)1− 2α (φ−1 − 1) 2α
δ :=
α
2
. (62)
With the notation defined in (33), the lower bound in (32) can
be expressed as
CLBSector = (1− σ)λl
log2
1 +
(
%
1+x
)δ
1 +
(
ς
x
)δ


+
. (63)
We assume that % > ς , such that a positive CLBSector can be
achieved by choosing x from
(
ς
%−ς ,∞
)
. More discussions
on the feasibility of a positive CLBSector can be found in [42].
Then, by the monotonicity of the logarithm function, maximiz-
ing CLBSector is equivalent to maximizing the following function:
f (x) =
(
1 +
(
%
1 + x
)δ)(
1 +
( ς
x
)δ)−1
. (64)
The derivative of f (x) w.r.t. x is given by
d
dx
f (x) =
ςδ + %
δςδ
(1+x)δ+1
− %δ
(
x
1+x
)δ+1
δ−1xδ+1
(
1 +
(
ς
x
)δ)2 (65)
where the denominator is always positive. When increasing x
from ς%−ς to infinity, the first two terms in the numerator
decreases from ςδ +%−1ςδ (%− ς)δ+1 to ςδ and the third term
increases from %−1ςδ+1 to %δ monotonically. Since % > ς ,
the derivative of f (x) is first positive and then negative
on x ∈
(
ς
%−ς ,∞
)
. When increasing φ from zero to one, the
value of x decreases from infinity to zero monotonically. This
implies that the derivative of CLBSector w.r.t. φ is first positive
and then negative with increasing φ, and thus the optimal value
of φ is unique.
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